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Japanese Companies on United States Soil:
Treaty Privileges vs. Title VII Restraints
By MATIHEW OREBIC
Member of the Class of 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
Affiliates of foreign companies currently employ nearly two million
people in the United States.1 Yet basic questions concerning whose law
controls employment discrimination suits brought by these employees re-
main unresolved. In the case of Japanese companies doing business in
the United States, lawsuits in which American employees have asserted
claims of unfair employment practices have focused on the conflict be-
tween two bodies of law: The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Nav-
igation between Japan and the United States2 (Japanese Treaty) and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).3
The general purpose of the Japanese Treaty is to grant the compa-
nies and citizens of either country equal or "national" treatment when
conducting business within the other country.4 Currently the United
States is party to approximately two dozen bilateral commercial treaties
1. Howenstine, Selected Data on the Operations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies,
1978 and 1979, SURV. OF CURRENT Bus. 35, 36 (1981).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
Art. X, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter Japanese Treaty].
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)).
Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
§ 703(a), 78 Stat. at 255, (as codified in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-2(a)).
4. Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 373, 385 (1956).
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that are substantially similar to the Japanese Treaty.' The overall goal of
these treaties is to encourage and foster international economic invest-
ment and growth that is mutually beneficial to both countries.6
The Japanese Treaty affords both parties great latitude in making
hiring decisions. Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty provides that
"companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the terri-
tories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, execu-
tive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."7
Article VIII(l) thus apparently provides a Japanese company operating
in the United States an unconditional right to hire only Japanese citizens
for the above named positions. Because ninety-nine percent of the popu-
lation of Japan consists of people who are of Japanese national origin,' a
Japanese company that hires only Japanese citizens would in effect be
hiring only people of Japanese national origin.
Title VII, on the other hand, prohibits hiring policies that have the
purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.9 When employment practices favor a class that
traditionally has been subjected to discrimination, such practices consti-
tute "reverse discrimination," which also violates Title VII.O As stated
above, a Japanese company operating in the United States appears to be
within its rights under the Japanese Treaty when hiring exclusively Japa-
nese citizens for the positions designated in Article VIII(l). Yet such a
5. For a partial list of these Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, see I
I.L.M. 92, 94 (1962).
6. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv.
805, 805-06 (1958).
7. See Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, at 2070 (emphasis added).
8. D. WHITAKER, AREA HANDBOOK FOR JAPAN 70 (Foreign Area Studies of the Amer-
ican University, 1974).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,
88 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).
10. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (holding that in enacting Title VII, Congress intended to
prohibit "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority.") (emphasis added);
see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976), where five years
after Griggs the Court expressly held that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against
whites in private employment on the same terms as it prohibits discrimination against non-
whites). But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (indicating
that under Title VII, race may be an affirmative factor when a particular employer is attempt-
ing to redress past discriminatory practices).
A Japanese employer operating in the United States would not be correcting its own past
discrimination against persons of Japanese national origin. Thus, a policy of hiring only per-
sons of Japanese ancestry would constitute impermissible reverse discrimination under Title
VII. For a further discussion of whether a Japanese citizenship requirement violates Title VII,
see infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 9
Title VII and the Japanese Friendship Treaty
practice may constitute reverse discrimination which violates Title VII.
This situation creates a conflict of laws.
The recent Supreme Court case of Sumitomo ShojiAmerica, Inc., v.
Avagliano 1 exemplifies this conflict. In Sumitomo, eleven female secre-
tarial employees of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., a United States cor-
poration, and a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation,
brought a class action suit against their employer. Plaintiffs claimed that
the company had discriminated against them on the basis of sex and na-
tional origin in violation of Title VII. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and
compensatory relief, claiming that Sumitomo restricted them to clerical
jobs and did not train them for or promote them to executive, managerial
or sales positions, which were reserved primarily for male citizens of
Japan.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals"2 on the issue of whether Sumitomo's employment
practices, which allegedly violated Title VII, were privileged under Arti-
cle VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty. Instead of resolving this central issue,
however, a unanimous Supreme Court disposed of the case by holding
that because Sumitomo Shoji America was incorporated in the United
States, it was not a "company of Japan," and therefore could claim no
rights under the Japanese Treaty. 3 As a United States corporation,
Sumitomo was forced to comply with Title VII. By so holding, the
Supreme Court resolved only the issue of who has standing to assert the
rights provided in Article VIII(l) and in the Japanese Treaty generally.
Locally incorporated subsidiaries of Japanese companies are considered
companies of the United States and therefore have no standing to assert
Treaty rights, whereas Japanese branch operations are still protected by
the Treaty.
Still unresolved after the Sumitomo decision is whether a branch
operation of a Japanese company operating in the United States could
successfully assert that the privileges regarding hiring practices in Article
VIII(l) provides a defense to a Title VII action.14 The importance of this
11. 457 U.S. 176 (1982), vacating and remanding 638 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1981).
12. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji, Am., Inc., 638 F. 2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated and
remanded, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
13. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 176.
14. In Sumitomo the Supreme Court stated that aside from the issue of an Article VIII(l)
defense to a Title VII claim it also declined to resolve the following issues: (1) whether
Sumitomo could assert a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) or a business necessity
defense for Japanese citizenship for the named positions in Article VIII(l) (for a discussion of
this issue, see infra, notes 106-129 and accompanying text), and (2) whether Sumitomo could
assert the Article VIII(1) rights of its parent corporation. The Court's refusal to decide the
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question is amplified when one considers the ease with which a locally
incorporated Japanese affiliate could shed its corporate status and be-
come a branch operation, 15 in order to regain the rights provided by the
Treaty. Because of this loophole in the Court's decision, the resolution of
whether Article VIII(l) or Title VII controls the hiring practices of
United States branches of Japanese companies remains crucial to deter-
mining the rights of both employers and employees of Japanese multina-
tional corporations operating in the United States.
This Note examines the continuing conflict between the Japanese
Treaty and Title VII. The Second and Fifth Circuits have heard cases on
whether Article VIII(l) provides a defense to Title VII. 6 In Sumitomo,
the Second Circuit held that Article VIII(l) did not exempt a Japanese
employer from compliance with Title VII. 7 Conversely, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Spiess, et al. v. C. Itoh & Co. 18 held that Article VIII(l) provided
an exception to Title VII and therefore was a valid defense.
In dissecting this conflict of laws issue, this Note first will define the
scope and the meaning of both Article VIII(l) and Title VII. After ana-
lyzing the relationship and the inevitable conflict between the two provi-
sions, this Note then will examine methods of resolving the conflict,
including the approaches used by the Fifth and Second Circuits. Special
attention will be given to Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification
second issue appears inappropriate in light of its holding that Japanese subsidiaries are United
States corporations and therefore have no standing to assert Treaty rights. If a subsidiary were
able to assert the Treaty right of its parent then the Court's decision not to allow locally
incorporated subsidiaries Treaty protection would be meaningless. For a full discussion of the
theoretical soundness of attempting such a defense, see Lewis & Ottley, Title VII and Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: Prognostications Based upon Sumitomo Shoji, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 45, 61-68 (1983).
15. A subsidiary is a company that is separate but affiliated with the parent company,
while a branch is an extension of the parent. Factors in determining separateness from the
parent include the following: (1) The business transactions of the two entities, (2) separation of
corporate procedures, (3) financial structure of the two entities, and (4) the public image of the
nature of the separation. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 354 (3d ed. 1983). The Court's
holding in Sumitomo that any company incorporated in the United States is a United States
company for purposes of asserting Treaty rights makes clear which companies are precluded
from claiming that they are branches and therefore afforded rights granted under the Treaty.
Nevertheless, any United States affiliate of a Japanese multinational that is a sufficiently inte-
gral part of its parent company potentially may shed its corporate status and become a branch
operation if it falls within the definition of a branch operation.
16. For a full discussion of both the Fifth and Second Circuits' opinions see infra notes
67-74 and accompanying text.
17. 638 F.2d at 552. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, the Court
only addressed the issue of standing to assert Treaty rights as an affirmative defense to Title
VII. Thus, the other aspects of the Second Circuit's ruling retain force.
18. 643 F. 2d 353, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1981).
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(BFOQ) exception which was incorporated into the Second Circuit's
opinion. Finally, the implications of resolving this issue in favor of
American plaintiffs or Japanese branches will be discussed.
II. THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE VIII(1)
OF THE JAPANESE TREATY
It is important to define both the scope of the rights provided by
Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty and the proscriptions of Title VII
before launching into a discussion of the potential conflict and reconcilia-
tion of the two laws. Neither the scope of Article VIII(l) nor the extent
of the restraints of Title VII for cases such as Sumitomo has well-defined
boundaries. Therefore, this section will address whether under Article
VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty, a Japanese branch may hire persons for
the positions described in Article VIII(l) exclusively from its own
citizenry.
The Supreme Court has held that treaties are to be construed "ac-
cording to the intention of the contracting parties, and so as to carry out
their manifest purpose. "19 Among the key factors suggested by the Re-
statement (Second) on Foreign Relations Law of the United States for
deciphering the intent of a treaty are the language of the treaty and its
negotiation history.20
A. Treaty Language
The language of Article VIII(l) is clear on its face. The section
provides in relevant part that "[n]ationals and companies of either Party
shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party,
accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys,
agents and other specialists of their choice."21 (The positions hereinafter
collectively are referred to as "upper-level management.") The problem
is whether the right to hire upper-level management "of their choice"
was intended to be an absolute or conditional right on the part of the
foreign employer.
When the employment provisions of Article VIII(l) are put in the
context of other rights granted in the Japanese Treaty, a three-tiered
heirarchy of rights emerges. From bottom to top, the rights contained in
19. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57 (1903). See also Bush v. United States, 71 F.2d 635
(5th Cir. 1934); American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Aerolinas Peruanasa, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. A.L. Burbank
& Co., 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 147 (1965).
21. Japanese Treaty, supra note 2 at 2070 (emphasis added).
1986]
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the Treaty are as follows: (1) contingent on most-favored-nation treat-
ment, by which the foreign investor is entitled to the highest level of
protection granted to citizens of any country; (2) contingent upon na-
tional treatment, by which a foreign investor is entitled to the same pro-
tection as is granted to domestic citizens; and (3) not contingent on the
treatment afforded anyone else.22 The first and second tiers concern
rights that are conditional in that they are defined by the treatment the
United States affords foreign and domestic citizens, respectively. The
third tier, however, appears to provide for rights that are absolute be-
cause they are not contingent on the treatment afforded anyone else.
Although most of the rights provided by the Treaty are granted on a
contingent basis, 23 the employment provisions of Article VIII(l) do not
explicitly refer to national or most-favored-nation treatment on their
face. Thus, the right to hire upper-level management personnel "of their
choice" provided in Article VIII(l) appears to fall within the highest tier
of rights provided by the Treaty, that of non-contingent, absolute
rights.
24
The scope of a Treaty right that is not contingent on the treatment
of other foreign corporations, or domestic United States corporations,
cannot then be delineated by the constraints of United States employ-
ment statutes. Thus, the primary determinants of the scope of Article
VIII(l) are its negotiation and legislative history.
B. Legislative and Negotiating History
The negotiation history addressing Article VIII(l) of the Japanese
Treaty indicates that the Article was designed to override laws, in both
Japan and several states in the United States, that restricted the employ-
ment of aliens in a discriminatory fashion. 25 Overriding the discrimina-
tion laws achieved the underlying purpose of assuring foreign investors
complete control of overseas operations by not requiring them to hire
locally for upper-level management positions.
At the time the Japanese Treaty was drafted, many states and many
other countries, including Japan, had "percentile" restrictions that se-
22. Walker, supra note 6, at 811.
23. See, e.g., Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, arts. III, IV, VI(4), VII, VIII(3), IX, X, XII,
XIII, XIV, XVI, XIX(4), at 2063, 2067-77.
24. Walker, supra note 6, at 811-12.
25. TREATIES OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, S. EXEc. Doc. No. 5,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter FCN TREATIES]. Walker, Treaties for the Encourage-
ment and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L.
229, 236-37 (1956).
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verely limited, and in certain professions prohibited, the employment of
aliens within their boundaries.26 American investors probably were more
concerned about this problem than their Japanese counterparts.27 Evi-
dence suggests that it was the United States that sought to include in the
Japanese Treaty,28 and in other commercial treaties as well,29 the right to
choose upper-level management employees without percentile restric-
tions. After the Japanese Treaty was ratified, Herman Walker, a leading
negotiator for the United States, noted that Article VIII assures "man-
agement ... freedom of choice in the engaging of essential executive and
technical employees in general, regardless of their nationality, without
interference from 'percentile' restrictions and the like."30 Dr. Walker's
comments make it clear that from the perspective of the United States,
and most likely from Japan's perspective as well, Article VIII(l) had the
underlying purpose of allowing a foreign company to circumvent any
restrictive domestic requirements that would force it to hire local man-
agement. This would permit the foreign company to hire the upper-level
management "of their choice" and thereby maintain control of overseas
operations by placing its own citizens in these positions.
Article I(l) 1 of the Japanese Treaty buttresses this interpretation of
Article VIII(l) by relaxing visa requirements of the host country for
foreign nationals affiliated with the foreign company, thus facilitating Ar-
ticle VIII(l)'s goal of parental control. Under Article I(1), Japanese citi-
zens acting as upper-level management employees for Japanese
employers may enter the United States under the specially created visa
categories of "treaty trader" or "treaty investor."32 It is unclear exactly
26. Walker, supra note 25, at 236-37.
27. Hearing on Commercial Treaties Before the Comm. on Commercial Treaties and Con-
sular Conventions of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952)
[hereinafter 1952 Hearings].
28. See Outgoing Airgram, Dep't. of State Div. of Communications and Records Tele-
graph Branch to USPOLAD, A-453 Tokyo (Jan. 7, 1952).
29. For example, the legislative report for the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(FCN) Treaty with Uruguay addressed the need for a treaty provision to guarantee American
companies the right "to employ American, as distinguished from foreign technical experts,
creative personnel, attorneys and other specialized employees." S. EXEC. REP. D, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1950). The Uruguayan Treaty served as a model for the Japanese Treaty. See S.
EXEC. REP. 0, 83d Cong., 1st Sess 2 (1953) (executive report for Japanese Treaty); Hearing on
Commercial Treaties Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Hearings].
30. Walker, supra note 25, at 234. Dr. Walker is the leading authority on commercial
treaties. He is credited by the United States State Department as the formulator of the modern
form of FCN treaties and has negotiated many such treaties on behalf of the United States.
31. Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, at 2066.
32. The United States Department of State, which administers and enforces the immigra-
tion laws, has adopted regulations establishing standards for treaty trader aliens employed in
19861
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what falls within upper-level management, but the criteria include fac-
tors such as job title, duties, degree of responsibility, and pay level.33
Because specialized visa treatment for foreign managers (called traders
or investors) was defined prior to,34 and subsequently included in, the
Japanese Treaty, it would appear that the parties intended to allow for-
eign employers to hire upper-level management personnel from among
their own citizens without being hindered by the host country's normal
visa requirements. Thus, Article I(1) supports the notion that the "of
their choice" language of Article VIII(l) is an absolute right.
The Senate Executive Report on the Japanese Treaty and several
other commerce treaties in negotiation at the time35 also suggest that the
purpose of Article VIII(l) was to bypass local restrictions on hiring
aliens.36 The legislative history surrounding the ratification of the Japa-
nese Treaty supports the view that the negotiations sought to secure a
foreign employer's right to make certain hiring decisions without regard
to nationality. Although the 1953 Senate Hearings on the Japanese
Treaty37 barely mention the "of their choice" provision of Article
VIII(l), the 1952 Senate Hearings for several other similar commercial
treaties38 do discuss the clause. During panel discussions on Article
VIII(l) of the United States-Israeli commercial treaty (which is identical
to Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty), one Senator summarized the
provisions as an apparent "attempt to give great latitude and privileges to
the United States under Japanese and other FCN treaties. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 (1985). Those
regulations require that a treaty trader be "engaged in duties of a supervisory or executive
character, or if he is or will be employed in a minor capacity, he has the specific qualification
that will make his services essential to the efficient operation of the employer's enterprise and
will not be employed solely in an unskilled manual capacity." Id. § 41.40(a). The Department
of State has developed supplementary internal guidelines to be used in determining whether
foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States are entitled to treaty trader status. See 9
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, reprinted in 6 C. GORDON &
H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1982); see also 22 C.F.R. § 41.41
(1985).
33. The Japanese Treaty is administratively implemented through the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 357, 66 Stat. 163, 272 (1952) (amended by 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-57 (1982)). The named criteria were relayed to the Japanese in Department of State
Telegram No. 089624 to Japanese Posts, par. 4, sent to all Diplomatic and Consular Posts on
July 6, 1981, reprinted in 58 INTERPRETER REL. No. 38, at 478, 479 (Sept. 17, 1981).
34. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 357 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(amended by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1011-57 (1982)).
35. FCN TREATIES, supra note 25.
36. Id. at 4.
37. 1953 Hearings, supra note 29, at 2. The text of the 1953 Hearing provides in relevant
part that "[o]f the special concern to investors are such assurances as those regarding... the
right of the owner to manage his own affairs and employ personnel of his choice ... ." Id.
38. 1952 Hearings, supra note 27.
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either party to use their own technical and professional experts within
the territory of the other."39
C. The Uncertain Scope of Article VIII
The Treaty's language and its legislative and negotiation history all
indicate that Article VIII(l) was intended, not only to override local dis-
crimination laws, but also to permit the companies of each country to
hire only their own citizens to manage overseas operations. The purpose
of the latter goal was to facilitate and assure control of overseas
investment.
Several factors, however, make interpretation of the scope of Article
VIII(l) difficult, and may well limit the weight that can be given the
drafters' intent. First, it is quite possible that, because of the weak eco-
nomic position of postwar Japan and the embryonic stage of Japanese
multinational corporations, the United States negotiators never antici-
pated the present strength and expansion of Japanese multinationals now
operating in the United States. Second, given the focus of Article
VIII(l), the negotiators may not have foreseen the potential for reverse
discrimination resulting from the "of their choice" provision. Third, and
most important, Title VII was not in existence when the Treaty was rati-
fied in 1953. Moreover, very few states had antidiscrimination employ-
ment statutes' which would have conflicted with the reverse
discrimination that Article VIII(l) may be interpreted to permit. In fact,
racial discrimination through segregation was officially sanctioned until
1954.41 These considerations make it difficult to assess what weight
should be given to the intent of the Treaty's drafters. Accordingly, reso-
lution of the conflict between Article VIII(l) and Title VII necessarily
must focus on the potential for reverse discrimination under the Treaty
in light of subsequent antidiscrimination legislation.
HI. CITIZENSHIP AS A VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
Whether hiring on the basis of citizenship violates Title VII is im-
portant to both Japanese branch operations, which still may assert
Treaty rights, and locally incorporated Japanese subsidiaries, which, af-
39. Id. at 38.
40. In 1953 the following states had civil rights laws affecting private employers: Con-
necticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island
and Washington. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 363
(1964).
41. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ter Sumitomo, no longer can assert Treaty rights.4 2 If plaintiffs in cases
such as Sumitomo cannot first establish that hiring on the basis of citizen-
ship violates Title VII, then they have no cause of action for employment
discrimination.43 For locally incorporated Japanese subsidiaries, if there
is no Title VII violation, their inability to resort to an Article VIII(l)
defense is inconsequential. For Japanese branch operations, if there is no
Title VII violation, then the issue of whether Title VIII(l) provides a
defense to a Title VII claim need not be reached. This section examines
whether hiring on the basis of citizenship in fact violates Title VII.
Title VII provides that "[ilt shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice... to discriminate against any individual.., because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, sex, or national origin."'  In its briefs, Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc., argued that hiring on the basis of Japanese citizen-
ship is not discrimination based on any impermissible classification stated
in Title VII, and therefore does not violate Title VII.45 Respondents,
Sumitomo's secretarial employees, argued that a policy of hiring only
Japanese citizens for upper-level management positions has the effect of
discriminating on the basis of national origin and therefore such hiring
does violate Title VII.46 The Court declined to decide the discrimination
issue.47
The only Supreme Court decision to examine the issue of citizenship
discrimination as a basis for a Title VII claim is Espinoza v. Farah Manu-
facturing Co. " In Espinoza, the plaintiff, a Mexican citizen and resident
alien of the United States, was denied employment at defendant company
because the company had an express policy against hiring aliens. Plain-
tiff alleged that this policy discriminated on the basis of national origin
and therefore violated Title VII.49 Defendant argued that the policy to
hire only United States citizens was not intended to discriminate, nor did
it in fact result in national origin discrimination because ninety-six per-
cent of its employees were of Mexican ancestry.5 °
42. See supra note 3.
43. Id.
44. Brief for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent at 14-18, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (No. 80-2070).
45. Brief for Respondents and Cross-Petitioners at 34, Sumitomo, (No. 80-2070).
46. The Supreme Court declined to decide the issue stating it "was not set forth or fairly
included in the questions presented for review .. " 457 U.S. at 180 n.4.
47. See infra note 66 and accompanying text; Japanese citizenship may be a bona fide
occupational qualification and therefore qualify as a statutory exception to Title VII. See infra
notes 106-129 and accompanying text.
48. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
49. Id. at 87.
50. Id. at 92-93.
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In its analysis, the Court stated that the "term 'national origin' on
its face refers to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly,
the country from which his or her ancestors came."51 Given the number
of Mexican-Americans employed by the defendant company in Espinoza,
it was obvious there was no discrimination on the basis of national origin.
Thus, the first part of the Court's holding stated that Congress did not
intend 2 to equate citizenship with national origin, and therefore citizen-
ship could not be the sole basis for a Title VII claim.
The Court specifically limited its holding, however, by stating that
"[c]ertainly Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship
whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin." 3 Clarifying the meaning of "purpose or effect," the
Court stated that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."54
Thus, the Court held in Espinoza that discrimination based on citizenship
does not violate Title VII unless such a policy has the purpose or effect of
national origin discrimination.
In applying the holding of Espinoza to the case of Japanese employ-
ers operating in the United States, some commentators have suggested
that if an employer may use United States citizenship as a valid hiring
criterion, then an employer also may use Japanese citizenship as a valid
hiring criterion.5 This argument, however, fails to recognize the full
holding of Espinoza, which requires that hiring on the basis of citizenship
not result in a discriminatory effect. Thus, if a hiring policy based upon
citizenship results in discrimination against a group of applicants on the
basis of national origin, then under Espinoza it would violate Title VII.
The United States citizenship requirement of the defendant com-
pany in Espinosa did not have the purpose or effect of discrimination
under Title VII. However, in the case of Japanese companies operating
in the United States, hiring only Japanese citizens would result in dis-
51. Id. at 89.
52. Id. at 89 (citing 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964)).
53. Id. at 92.
54. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
55. See Note, Commercial Treaties and American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese
Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947, 958 (1979) [hereinafter Commercial Treaties]; Lansing and
Palmer, Sumitomo Shoji v. Avagliano: Sayonara to Japanese Employment Practices in Conflict
with Title VII, 28 ST. Louis U. L. J. 153, 162 (1984); Note, Japanese Corporations and Ameri-
can Civil Rights Law, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93, 98 (1982) [hereinafter Japanese
Corporations].
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crimination against virtually every national origin except Japanese.5 6 In
Sumitomo, the Supreme Court implied that hiring only Japanese citizens
for executive positions may have the requisite "purpose or effect" to con-
stitute national origin discrimination.57 Such a practice by Japanese
companies operating in the United States clearly constitutes reverse
discrimination."
Although no court has determined the impermissibility of reverse
discrimination through classification by national origin, the Supreme
Court consistently has rejected attempts to distinguish different forms of
discrimination by whether they are designed to benefit or harm racial
minorities.59 As an exception to the ban on reverse discrimination, the
Court has allowed affirmative action only in the context of a university
correcting its own past discriminatory practices.6 ° Thus, it follows that
without a showing of past discriminatory practices by a particular Japa-
nese employer against its own nationals, reverse discrimination would
not be permitted on the basis of national origin. Because such a showing
is unlikely, it appears that Japanese companies operating in the United
56. Ninety-nine percent of Japan's population is of Japanese origin. D. WHITAKER, AREA
HANDBOOK FOR JAPAN 70 (American Univ. Foreign Area Studies, 1974).
One commentator suggests that for United States citizens as a class to state a cause of
action in Title VII they must first show that the term "American" characterizes a single na-
tional origin. Japanese Corporations, supra note 55, at 97. This is erroneous because all na-
tional origins except the Japanese would have a valid cause of action under Title VII vis-a-vis
reverse discrimination principles. See supra note 10. But see Novak v. World Bank, Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1166, 1167 (D.D.C. 1979); Dowling v. United
States, 476 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (D. Mass. 1979). If a Japanese-American wanted to state a
cause of action, however, national origin discrimination could not be the basis of the cause of
action, although sex discrimination could be.
On the issue of standing, one commentator suggests that American citizens would lack
standing to assert a Title VII claim against a Japanese corporation in the United States which
discriminates in favor of its own nationals. See Commercial Treaties, supra note 55, at 958.
This conclusion presupposes an unsettled point of law. Only if the Treaty is held to shield
Japanese branches from Title VII would American citizens lack standing to assert a cause of
action based on Title VII. For a discussion of Japanese citizens' right to assert a Title VII
claim in American courts see Note, supra note 10, at 972-75.
Finally, if Japanese companies operating in the United States can establish Japanese citi-
zenship as a BFOQ or as a business necessity, then American citizens would have standing to
sue, but would be defeated in their claims. For a full discussion of this issue, see infra notes
106-129 and accompanying text.
57. 457 U.S. 176, 180 n.4 (1982); Contra, Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679, 1684, n.3 (N.D. I1. 1981) "[I]f a defendant is
discriminating only in favor of Japanese citizens ... it is doubtful a cause of action is stated
under Title VII.").
58. See supra note 10.
59. Id.
60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (hinting that under
Title VII race may be an affirmative factor in limited instances).
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States that hire management personnel on the basis of Japanese citizen-
ship are practicing reverse national origin discrimination in violation of
Title VII.
61
IV. IS ARTICLE VIII(1) A DEFENSE TO TITLE VII?
The preceding two sections establish that (1) Article VIII(l) of the
Japanese Treaty may allow a Japanese branch to hire upper-level man-
agement exclusively from its own citizenry,62 and (2) hiring exclusively
on the basis of Japanese citizenship constitutes reverse national origin
discrimination63 prohibited by Title VII.6 Thus, when a branch of a
Japanese company operating in the United States65 asserts its Treaty
61. The logic of the Court's holding in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973),
can become strained when a foreign employer operating in the United States discriminates
against American citizens as a group. The Court in Espinoza held that discrimination on the
basis of citizenship does not violate Title VII unless it has the purpose or effect of national
origin discrimination. Id. This holding implies that if the mere effect of a citizenship require-
ment produces a work force of a single national origin to the exclusion of all others (reverse
discrimination), then the requirement violates Title VII. Such a rule for foreign companies
operating in the United States, however, seems to create an arbitrary and artificial distinction
between foreign employers from countries with heterogeneous and homogeneous national an-
cestries. For instance, in the case of a foreign employer from a country with a homogeneous
national ancestry (such as Japan) reverse national origin discrimination is clear. If, however,
the foreign employer is from a country that is heterogeneous in its national ancestries (e.g.,
Canada) and those different national origins are represented in the company's personnel, then
the claim of reverse national origin discrimination is more difficult to substantiate. A second
problem arises when assessing which American plaintiffs have standing to assert a Title VII
claim against a foreign company that has a foreign citizenship requirement for its United
States branch. Again, an element of arbitrariness arises. For instance, a black man could not
assert a racial discrimination claim against a Nigerian company with a citizenship requirement
for its branch in the United States. Conversely, a white man could not assert such a claim
against a French company. The lines become harder to draw in cases of national origin (e.g.
Hungarian plaintiffs against a Polish company, etc.). Moreover, in the case of Sumitomo, a
Japanese-American who may be among the best-qualified Americans to work in the upper-
management of a Japanese company operating in the United States, ironically is in the only
group that may not assert a claim of national origin discrimination. Thus, from the viewpoint
of both the foreign employer and the American plaintiff there is an element of arbitrariness as
to who violates Title VII with a citizenship requirement and who has standing to sue. Both are
contingent on the racial or national ancestry of the foreign employer's native country.
If the goal of Title VII is to mix national origins and races, this result is necessary. But if
the goal is equal protection, then one of two solutions to the above problem is possible. First, a
double standard could be created whereby it is permissible to require United States citizenship
for employment, but impermissible to exclude employees on the basis of United States citizen-
ship. Second, the Espinoza holding could be modified so that citizenship requirements are
valid unless they only have the prupose and not merely the effect of discrimination.
62. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
65. Since the Supreme Court decided Sumitomo, Japanese subsidiaries in the United
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right to hire only its own nationals for upper-level management posi-
tions, there exists a direct conflict with the provisions of Title VII.
This section will examine whether the Treaty right or the proscrip-
tions of Title VII is the controlling law in this situation. Determining
which law controls will resolve the issue of whether the Treaty right
granted to Japanese branches to hire only Japanese citizens for upper
level management positions is a valid defense to a reverse national origin
discrimination claim based on Title VII.
A. The Opinions of the Fifth and Second Circuits
When the Second Circuit considered the Sumitomo case, it deter-
mined that Article VIII(l) did not create an exemption to compliance
with Title VII.66 Instead, the court found that Title VII is consistent
with the language of the Treaty because Title VII itself contains an ex-
emption which, "construed in the light of the [T]reaty would not pre-
clude the company from employing Japanese nationals in positions where
such employment is reasonably necessary to the successful operation of
its business."67 In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on
the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exemption in section
703(e) of Title VII68 which provides that: "[I]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees...
on the basis of... national origin if it is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise ....
The Second Circuit recognized that the bona fide occupational qual-
ification exemption in Title VII is construed "narrowly in the normal
context" but concluded that "under Article VIII of the Treaty it must be
construed in a manner that will give due weight to the Treaty rights and
unique requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the United
States .... Thus, the Second Circuit advocated a relaxed standard7'
States no longer may claim rights provided by Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty. Hence,
the primary issues for Japanese subsidiaries in the realm of employment practices are whether
the Japanese citizenship requirement violates Title VII, see supra notes 42-61 and accompany-
ing text, or, whether a citizenship requirement can be categorized as a BFOQ (see infra notes
106-129 and accompanying text).
66. 638 F.2d 552, 558 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 559.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)).
70. Id.
71. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's "relaxed standard" to establish a BFOQ, see
infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
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for determining the appropriate requirements to establish a Japanese citi-
zenship BFOQ in a Japanese company, but held that Title VII applied to
Japanese companies regardless of the Treaty rights.
An entirely different result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Spiess
v. C. Itoh & Co. (America).72 Spiess was a class action suit, virtually
identical to Sumitomo, brought against a Japanese subsidiary in which
the defendant company also claimed that Article VIII(l) of the Treaty
shielded it from Title VII liability. The court held that Article VIII(l)
did indeed carve out a valid exception to Title VII coverage and was an
adequate defense. The Court stated:
Domestic employment discrimination laws occupy a high priority
on the nation's agenda, and courts often resolve statutory conflicts in
their favor. In this case, however, resolving doubts in favor of Title
VII would go beyond the judicial sphere of interpretation. In the ab-
sence of Congressional guidance, we decline to abrogate the American
government's solemn undertaking with respect to a foreign nation.73
As a result of the Spiess decision, branches of Japanese companies operat-
ing in the Fifth Circuit are free to discriminate in favor of their own
citizens in filling positions named in Article VIII(l).74
B. Methods of Resolving the Conflict
It is not surprising that the circuits reached different results given
the flexibility of case law on the subject of reconciling treaties with fed-
eral statutes. The Constitution provides that both treaties and federal
statutes are the supreme law of the land.7" As such, both are weighed
equally.76 In resolving potential conflicts between treaties and federal
laws, the well-established principle set forth in Baker v. Carr77 requires
that the courts first attempt to reconcile the two. As early as 1888, the
Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson 71 stated that when a treaty pro-
vision and a statute relate to the same subject, "the courts will always
endeavor to construct them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either . . . .- If, however, a
72. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. Id. at 362.
74. Japanese companies which are incorporated in the United States, however, cannot
assert any rights under the Japanese Treaty after the Supreme Court decision in Sumitomo.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
75. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
76. Fong Yua Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720-21 (1893).
77. 369 U.S. 186, 194 (1962).
78. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
79. Id. at 194.
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treaty and a federal statute are in irreconcilable conflict, the doctrine set
forth in Fong Yua Ting v. United States requires that "the last expression
of the sovereign will" must control.8 0
There are two potential means to resolve the conflict between Title
VII and Article VIII(l). First, applying the Baker standard, the courts
would analyze whether Title VII and Article VIII(l) can be interpreted
to give effect to both without violating the language of either. Article
VIII(l) and Title VII only can be read in a consistent manner if either
Article VIII(l) is interpreted to allow Japanese companies to hire upper-
level management "of their choice," providing they do so in a manner
that does not abrogate Title VII, or Title VII is held not to apply to
foreign employers, or more specifically, to situations arising under Arti-
cle VIII(l). 1 The first interpretation requires the "narrowing" of Article
VIII(l); the second requires the "narrowing" of Title VII. If, however,
the court finds that the narrowing violates the intent behind the one or
the other, then the two laws are considered irreconcilable. Such a deter-
mination would require the courts to look to the doctrine of "the last
expression of the sovereign will." 2 Under this doctrine, Title VII would
supersede any inconsistent provisions of the Japanese Treaty since Title
VII was passed by Congress in 1964, eleven years after the ratification of
the Treaty.
1. Narrowing Article VIII(l)
The legislative history of Article VIII(l) could be read to support
the interpretation that Article VIII(l) was intended merely to override
laws that restricted the employment of aliens.8 3 If this were the only
purpose of Article VIII(l), then a court could circumscribe its use and
scope to the parameters of Title VII. The result of this approach would
be to allow Japanese employers to hire the upper management "of their
choice" regardless of nationality as long as they did not discriminate in
favor of their own citizens. Thus, the rights provided in Article VIII(l)
would have to be read very narrowly to achieve a result consistent with
Title VII. Such a reading, however, would be contrary to the true intent
80. 149 U.S. 698, 721 (1893).
81. A third alternative would be to hold that Title VII does not prohibit citizenship dis-
crimination. This would be contrary, however, to the Court's holding in Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), because of the discriminatory effect a Japanese citizenship re-
quirement would have in the categories of national origin and race (see supra notes 42-61 and
accompanying text).
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
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of Article VIII(l), which was to assure control of overseas investment.8 4
Moreover, a narrow interpretation of Article VIII(l) would offend an
important principle of treaty interpretation as set forth in Askura v. City
of Seattle.85 Askura mandates the application of a broad and liberal
spirit when defining the scope of a treaty right. The rationale for the
Askura principle of a broad interpretation rests in both the reluctance of
courts to formulate foreign policy indirectly and in their desire to assure
treaty beneficiaries of their full rights.8 6 Despite Askura, the Second Cir-
cuit essentially adopted the approach of narrowing the meaning of Arti-
cle VIII(l), 7 although it added that the statutory exception to Title VII
(the BFOQ) should be applied to a Japanese citizenship "requirement"
with a lower level of scrutiny in deference to the intent of the Treaty.
8 8
2. Narrowing Title VII
The second method of reconciling Title VII with Article VIII(l) is
narrowing the scope of Title VII. This could be done by interpreting
Title VII as either not applicable to foreign employers, or as inapplicable
to situations arising under Article VIII(l). There is nothing in the legis-
lative history of Title VII to support the contention that Title VII does
not apply equally to foreign and domestic employers in the United
States. 9 Indeed, a court would be adopting a counter-intuitive interpre-
84. Id.
85. 265 U.S. 332 (1923).
86. Id.
87. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981); see also
infra notes 106-129 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text. The only other court to decide the
issue of whether an article similar to Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty creates an exemp-
tion or defense to Title VII was the Eastern Federal District Court of New York (also in the
Second Circuit) in the case of Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). The court held in Linskey that the provision in the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United States-Denmark, 12 U.S.T 908, T.I.A.S.
No. 4797, which corresponds to Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty, did not exempt a
Danish corporation from compliance with Title VII. The court found the legislative history of
the provision focused primarily on relaxing visa requirements for the host country's nationals
and therefore was inadequate to serve as a shield to Title VII. Linskey, 420 F. Supp. at 1186.
The court stated that Article VII(4) (which corresponds with Article VIII(l) in the Japanese
Treaty), "was not intended to immunize foreigners from claims under the host country's em-
ployment discrimination laws." Id. In addition the court stated that "[a] different ruling
would provide an unjustified loophole with wide ranging effects for the enforcement of Title
VII." Id. at 1187.
89. The legislation does not refer to international matters in any way except in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (1976), which provides that the Act "shall not apply to an employer with respect to
the employment of aliens outside any State .... " This clause appears to address the preven-
tion of extraterritorial application of the Act regarding persons not within the jurisdiction of
the United States.
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tation of Title VII if it held that because the statute does not refer explic-
itly to foreign employers, they are exempt from its provisions. Clearly,
Title VII is comprehensive in that it applies to all employers equally un-
less otherwise indicated.
There is support, however, for the position that Title VII does not
apply specifically to Article VIII(l). For instance, in Morton v. Man-
cari9 ° the Supreme Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 197291 did not nullify preferential hiring of American Indians in
certain circumstances under Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act
of 193492 even though the Equal Employment Opportunity Act was en-
acted later in time. In reaching its conclusion, the Court applied the
general principle that a specific statute should not be deemed overruled
by a subsequent general statute on the same subject.9 3 Using this ration-
ale, a court could find that the more specific Article VIII(l) is not over-
ruled by the more general Title VII.
Morton is easily distinguished from the case of Japanese employers,
however, because in Morton the Court was able to cite ample support for
allowing Section 12 of the Indian Act to carve out an exception to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act. First, the Court noted that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act was based on Title VII, which spe-
cifically exempts preferential employment of American Indians on or
near Indian reservations.94 Second, Congress has had a longstanding
federal policy of affording Indians preferential hiring treatment.9" There
is no such analogous support for allowing Article VIII(l) of the Japanese
Treaty to carve out a similar exception to Title VII.
96
In Spiess,9 7 the Fifth Circuit supported its finding that Congress in-
90. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
92. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-486 (1976).
93. 417 U.S. at 550-551.
94. Title VII excludes "an Indian Tribe" from its definition of "employer," providing in
relevant part that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or
near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment prac-
tice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to
any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(i) (1976).
95. Justice Blackmun, in Morton, stated that prior to the 1972 Act, which forbids employ-
ment discrimination within the federal government, Executive Orders made an exception for
Indian preferences within the Bureau. Moreover, the Justice noted that three months after the
enactment of the 1974 Act, Congress passed two additional Indian preference laws. 417 U.S.
at 548-49.
96. See supra note 89.
97. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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tended Article VIII(l) to be an exception to Title VII by pointing out
that there is no mention of Article VIII(l) in the congressional record
pertaining to the enactment of Title VII.98 The court reasoned that the
Treaty right should not be modified because "[n]o evidence suggests that
Congress intended to repudiate Article VIII(l) when it enacted Title
VII. ' 99 If something concrete could be gleaned from the congressional
silence on Article VIII(l) and similar provisions granted in similar trea-
ties during the enactment of Title VII, the Fifth Circuit's decision might
have the implicit support of congressional intent. The inference, how-
ever, that congressional silence is tacit approval for using Article VIII(l)
to abrogate Title VII seems counter-intuitive. Further analysis of the
implications of congressional silence is required in attempting to resolve
the conflict.
C. The Meaning of Congressional Silence
There are three possible explanations for the lack of any congres-
sional record regarding Article VIII(l) during the enactment of Title
VII. First, and least likely, Congress may not have mentioned Article
VIII(l) because it intended the Treaty to grant preferential status to for-
eign employers, thereby allowing for some limited reverse discrimination
despite Title VII. This scenario, which essentially is advocated by the
Spiess court, is implausible. Had Congress made a conscious decision to
create exceptions to Title VII, such a decision certainly would have been
mentioned in the congressional hearings. The analysis of the Speiss court
is therefore unsatisfactory.
Second, in 1964 Congress may have interpreted Article VIII(l) so
narrowly that it was not perceived as a potential tool for reverse discrimi-
nation. Thus, there would have been no need to discuss Article VIII(l)
because under such a narrow interpretation, it could not violate Title
VII. Under this view, the Spiess court's interpretation of congressional
silence would be an erroneous and inaccurate representation of congres-
sional perception.
Third, and perhaps most likely, Article VIII(l) may not have been
considered by Congress at all during the enactment of Title VII. If Con-
gress failed to recognize the potential use of Article VIII(l) for reverse
discrimination, then the courts must decide what Congress would have
done had it been aware of this potential.
98. 643 F.2d at 362.
99. Id. Note that the court in Spiess correctly characterized Article VIII(l) as an absolute
right that afforded preferential treatment. Id. at 360.
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The courts' interpretation of congressional silence on Article
VIII(l) during the enactment of Title VII is central to resolving the con-
flict of laws between Article VIII(l) and Title VII. As demonstrated
above, however, the task of interpreting Congress' silence is a difficult
one. In fact, it may have been the uncertainty created by this silence that
led the Supreme Court in Sumitomo to avoid the question completely.
The Court, instead of addressing congressional silence, disposed of the
case on the narrow issue of standing.l°0
D. Decision According to Precedent
In accordance with the principles discussed above, if the courts in-
terpret Article VIII(l) narrowly, a position only partially supported by
the Article's legislative history, 101 they could reconcile Article VIII(l)
with Title VII in accordance with Baker"0 2 and Whitney. "3 If, however,
the courts define Article VIII(l) broadly, as mandated by Askura, " they
would then be faced with an irreconcilable conflict between Article
VIII(l) and Title VII.
Another way to resolve the conflict would be to allow Article
VIII(l) to carve out an exception to Title VII. This approach is unac-
ceptable, however, because there is absolutely no indication that Con-
gress would support such action.
Congressional silence on Article VIII(l) during the enactment of
Title VII indicates that in 1964 Congress did not see the potential use of
Article VIII(l) for reverse discrimination. If this is the case, the courts
simply must acknowledge that Article VIII(l) grants rights that are in
irreconcilable conflict with the restraints of Title VII. As "the last ex-
pression of the sovereign will,"' 1 5 Title VII would render Article VIII(l)
100. 457 U.S. 176 (1982). The language of the Court's opinion in Sumitomo gives mixed
signals as to whether Article VIII(l) might exempt Japanese branches from Title VII liability.
After rejecting the Second Circuit's argument of a "crazy-quilt pattern" that would emerge if
branches and subsidiaries are not treated equally, the Court states that "[t]he only significant
advantage branches may have over subsidiaries is that conferred by Article VIII(l)." Id.; see
Sumitomo, 638 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1981). The use of the word "may" is ambiguous. That
Article VIII(l) applies to Japanese branches is clear, but whether it will yield any significant
advantage if Title VII is held to be violated by branches remains unresolved even in this dicta.
Clearly, the Court could have chosen a grammatical construction such as "[t]he only signifi-
cant advantage branches would have over subsidiaries.. ." if it cared to shed some light on the
issue.
101. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text; see supra text accompanying notes 83-
84.
102. 369 U.S. 186, 194 (1962).
103. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
104. 265 U.S. 332 (1923).
105. Fong Yua Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 721 (1893).
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ineffective as a defense to an action based on Title VII to the extent that
Article VIII(l) or its applications are inconsistent with Title VII. In
short, Title VII would be the controlling law.
If Title VII is the controlling law, courts may still choose to incor-
porate the Second Circuit's suggestion to review Japanese citizenship as a
BFOQ for upper-level management with a more lenient standard than
that applied to other types of BFOQ's, thereby giving some deference to
the fights granted in the Treaty. Regardless of the standard applied, the
BFOQ exemption may become a last resort of branches of Japanese com-
panies operating in the United States if Title VII is deemed controlling
over Article VIII(l). Finally, because Japanese companies incorporated
in the United States no longer have standing to assert fights under the
Japanese Treaty, the BFOQ exemption to Title VII also may represent
their last defense to employment discrimination claims.
V. THE JAPANESE EMPLOYER'S BFOQ DEFENSE TO
TITLE VII
One exception to Title VII's prohibition on employment discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is the "bona fide
occupational qualification" I°6 (BFOQ). To establish a valid BFOQ, the
qualification must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise."10 7 The Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) and the federal courts, both empowered
to interpret Title VII,108 have declared that the BFOQ exemption is
"meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
106. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 241, 256 (1976) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2e (1982)). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Note that race and color can never be grounds for a BFOQ.
This note will not discuss the "business necessity" defense which is a judicially created
exemption to Title VII designed to serve the same purpose as the BFOQ. The "business neces-
sity" defense is only applicable when the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the disparate
impact theory, whereas the BFOQ defense is only applicable where the cause of action is based
on disparate treatment. Thus, because Japanese citizenship is technically a neutral guideline
that has an impermissible disparate impact on applicants not of Japanese national origin, busi-
ness necessity would technically be the appropriate defense. The test to establish the "business
necessity" defense is essentially identical to only the first prong of the case law BFOQ test (see
infra note 120 and accompanying text) and is thus incorporated within it. Accordingly, this
Note will focus on the more complex BFOQ test. For a full discussion of applicability of the
"business necessity" defense, see Lewis & Ottley, supra note 14, at 89-91.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2e.
108. The EEOC is the principal mechanism through which Title VII is enforced. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4-2000e-6 (1976). A five-member Presidentially appointed commission is re-
sponsible for receiving employment discrimination complaints, investigating them, and at-
tempting to eliminate unlawful practices informally, or, in the alternative, authorizing the
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In Sumitomo, the Supreme Court stated, "We express no view as to
whether Japanese citizenship may be a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for certain positions at Sumitomo ... "110 Indeed, this issue was not
properly before the Court.'11 This section briefly examines the extent to
which Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ for a Japanese company
operating in the United States.
In dictum, the Sumitomo Court stated, "[t]here can be little doubt
that some positions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in
the United States call for great familiarity with not only the language of
Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business practices of that coun-
try.' '1 2 Respondents conceded this exact point in their brief, but argued
that persons who are not of Japanese origin or Japanese citizenship could
also meet these requirements.
1 13
A. Permissible Criteria
It is difficult to ascertain the precise boundaries of the BFOQ ex-
emption as it applies to Japanese employers in the United States.' 1 4 No
aggrieved party to bring civil suit in federal court. The EEOC also is empowered to bring suit
on behalf of the plaintiffs and to issue regulations and guidelines interpreting Title VII.
109. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 326 (1976);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1976); EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1604.2(a)(2), 1606.4 (1982).
110. 457 U.S. 176, 189 (1982).
111. Id. at 190.
112. Id.
113. Brief for Respondents and Cross-Petitioners at 34, Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176 (No. 80-
2070).
114. Because top management of a Japanese branch virtually qualify automatically under
the BFOQ and business necessity exemptions, and all the lower positions not named in Article
VIII(l) of the Treaty are automatically subject to Title VII, the margin of people left to assert
a Title VII claim are all those wishing to gain positions named in the Treaty excluding top
management. The size of this class, however, is significant, given the large presence and rate of
growth of Japanese companies operating in the United States. See supra note 1 and infra notes
134-136. The size of this class is increased in the case of Japanese companies because there is a
relatively large number of people that could qualify as "executive personnel" and "agents"
under Article VIII(l) in Japanese style of management. For instance, ..... Japanese compa-
nies' use of their own nationals is not confined to higher echelons as with most other foreign
multinational corporations, but permeates middle and junior management levels as well."
Sethi & Swanson, Problem for Foreign Companies: Compliance with U.S. Discrimination Laws,
68 MGMT. REV. 32 (1979). This is because Japanese companies have a unique style of man-
agement that emphasizes the integration of different levels of management. The integrated
system of management which extends personal ties down to labor personnel is a key compo-
nent in a complex decision-making process characteristic of Japanese companies. Thus, the
hiring of their own citizens allows the Japanese parent company better to"exercise parental
control and to introduce their own way of doing business into their U.S. affiliates." Id.
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reported decisions directly deal with a BFOQ exemption that allows dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin or citizenship. The legislative
history of Title VII reveals through two isolated remarks an intent, in
certain limited instances, to allow for a BFOQ based on national ori-
gin.11 Both remarks pertain to a hypothetical example in which it
would be permissible for a French or Italian restaurant to require a
French or Italian Chef in order to attract customers."6 The EEOC and
the courts, however, have construed the BFOQ narrowly117 and have not
permitted employment discrimination based on the preferences of em-
ployers, clients or customers." l" Thus, a requirement that, for example,
the chef in a French restaurant actually be a French national to satisfy
customers is now questionable in light of these pronouncements.
1. The Two-Pronged Test
Most cases dealing with the BFOQ exemption have involved sex dis-
crimination. A number of lower courts have developed a two-pronged
test to evaluate the legality of gender based BFOQ's.' 1 9 Under this test
the defendant must prove: (1) The BFOQ is necessary to the essence of
its business (business necessity); and (2) There is reasonable cause to be-
lieve that substantially all those outside the BFOQ (usually women)
would be unable to perform the job efficiently. 120
If the courts apply the gender based BFOQ test to reverse national
origin discrimination among Japanese employers, the questions presented
would be entirely factual. The second prong of the test would probably
be satisfied in most instances. Given the unique style of management of
Japanese multinational corporations, 12 1 and the fact that style is rooted
in Japanese culture, a Japanese employer could with little difficulty estab-
lish that "substantially all" applicants who are not Japanese citizens of
Japanese origin "would be unable to perform the job efficiently."' 2 2 The
ease with which a Japanese employer could meet the second prong, how-
ever, necessarily depends on the level of familiarity with Japanese cul-
115. 110 Cong. Rec. 7212 (1964); 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964).
116. Id.
117. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971); 1973 E.E.O.C. Compl. Man. (CCH) par. 6247 (Decision No. 71-2338) (June
2, 1971).
119. See generally Lewis & Ottley, supra note 14, at 76-80.
120. See Usery 20 v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 235-36, (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 976 (1976).
121. See supra note 114.
122. 531 F.2d at 224.
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ture, business, and the parent company required by the specific job in
question.
The larger factual problem lies in the first prong of the test, which
requires that the BFOQ be necessary to the essence of the business.
Again, the unique management style of Japanese multinationals is an im-
portant factor because it makes it unclear whether Japanese citizenship
or national origin123 is a business necessity as distinguished from a mere
business convenience.
2. The Second Circuit Formula
In an effort to accommodate Japanese companies operating in the
United States, the Second Circuit in Sumitomo 124 ignored the strict test
for establishing a gender based BFOQ. Rather, the Court constructed a
specific, broader BFOQ test for Japanese companies. This test consisted
of four requirements:
(1) [K]nowledge of the Japanese language and culture; (2) familiarity
with Japanese products, markets, business practices, and customs; (3)
acquaintance with the staff and functioning of the Japanese parent en-
terprise; and (4) acceptability to the customers or clients of the com-
pany or branch.1
25
Although the Supreme Court did not comment on the Second Circuit's
new test, the "customer preference" requirement represents a significant
departure from established case law regarding BFOQ's. 126 The EEOC's
123. Japanese citizenship and national origin are grouped together here, albeit loosely, be-
cause Japanese companies that would discriminate in favor of Japanese citizens also would
choose Japanese citizens that are a part of Japanese culture. Japanese citizenship is preferred
so that the parent company freely may transfer its employees to different branches and subse-
quently bring them home to Japan permanently. Japanese national origin is preferred to en-
sure cultural understanding.
124. 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981).
125. Id. At the time of the Second Circuit's decision in Sumitomo, the court assumed that
all Japanese companies operating in the United States, including those that were locally incor-
porated, could assert rights under the Japanese Treaty. The Supreme Court's subsequent hold-
ing that only branches of Japanese companies that are not locally incorporated may assert the
rights provided by Article VIII(l) of the treaty does not affect the Second Circuit's findings
regarding the BFOQ exception for Japanese employers running branch operations. However,
because the Second Circuit adopted a customized test for determining if a BFOQ exists for
Japanese companies in order to give deference to Treaty rights, it can now be argued that
Japanese companies that are incorporated locally within the Second Circuit cannot take ad-
vantage of this test, as there is no longer any need to give deference to Treaty rights which
these companies do not have.
126. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (197 1) (customer preference for female flight attendants did not justify BFOQ excep-
tion); Entertaining Customers Not Valid Basis for Sex Discrimination, 1973 E.E.O.C. Compl.
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amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court disapproved of the customer
preference factor.127 It argued that subjective criteria such as customer
or employer preference consistently have been rejected by the courts.
Moreover, the EEOC maintained that all of the remaining requirements
could be satisfied by persons not of Japanese origin.' Indeed, to argue
that "familiarity with language, culture, customs, and business practices"
is unique to citizenship is to advance the very stereotyping Title VII
condemns. 129
3. Current State of the Law
Future lawsuits brought under Title VII against Japanese employers
Man. (CCII) par. 6247 (Decision No. 71-2338) (June 2, 1971) (customers' preference for male
employees to accompany them on hunting trips did not justify BFOQ exception).
127. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26 n.15, Diaz, 442 F.2d 385 (No.
30098).
128. Id.
129. Some commentators, however, assert that Title VII was not intended to change the
cultural biases of foreign employers operating in the United States, and therefore should not be
applied with the same degree of scrutiny. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 14, at 87. Lewis and
Ottley point out that the values that Title VII selectively has chosen to promote cannot easily
be applied cross-culturally with the same notions of fairness. For instance, United States
courts have allowed customer preference to make gender a BFOQ if the job requires sexual
privacy. The courts' rationale for this exception is that Title VII was not intended to "make
over the mores and personal sensitivities of the American people .... " Id. at 83 (citing I.A.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 14.30 (1982)). Not surprisingly, courts have also
held that gender cannot be a BFOQ simply to support a stereotypical notion of customer
preferences. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385; see also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil, 653 F.2d 1273 (9th
Cir. 1981) (gender as a BFOQ to satisfy customer preferences is equally unacceptable in the
international and domestic settings). Lewis and Ottley note that most Japanese may not be as
concerned with sexual privacy as most Americans. Lewis & Ottley, supra note 14, at 87 n.276.
However, the Japanese may have deeply seated personal sensitivities about women in the mar-
ketplace not felt in this country. Thus, Lewis and Ottley assert that while Americans' concern
for sexual privacy should not be ignored, Japanese cultural values also should be taken into
account in determining what is a proper BFOQ for a Japanese company operating in the
United States.
It is, of course, appropriate to consider whether an applicant for a position in a Japanese
company understands Japanese culture to the extent necessary for the particular position for
which he or she has applied. However, this consideration should not be extended to whether
the applicant will be well-accepted in the company or its culture solely on the basis of his or
her immutable characteristics. Courts have not allowed customer or employer preferences,
sexual privacy excepted, to justify work discrimination. See supra note 125. This rule has been
extended to American multinationals that must deal with the cultural preferences of custom-
ers abroad. See Fernandez, 653 F.2d 1273. It follows that this standard should continue to be
upheld for foreign companies doing business in the United States. In sum, equality should be
promoted over the business practicality of pleasing foreign employers, and such employers
should view this law as the price of doing business in the United States. To rule otherwise,
creates a slippery slope on which all cultural preferences of a foreign employer regarding em-
ployees must be accommodated.
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will require the courts to determine the actual job requirements for vari-
ous management positions in Japanese companies. Currently, the weight
of legal authority mandates application of the standard two-pronged test
for determining whether the BFOQ exemption is applicable in a given
case. The courts, however, should be careful to consider not only the
conventional skills required to perform management jobs in a Japanese
company, but also the applicant's understanding of a unique and cultur-
ally based system of management. If both of these criteria are satisfied,
the parent company's legitimate right under the Japanese Treaty to
maintain control of its overseas operation should not be impaired.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Currently, the circuits are split on the question of whether Title VII
applies to positions named in Article VIII(l) for branches of Japanese
companies operating in the United States. 30 Judicial or congressional
extension of the scope of Title VII to include Japanese branches in the
United States would have enormous repercussions. The United States is
party to more than two dozen treaties that are substantially similar to the
Japanese Treaty.' 3 ' These treaties contain similar, identical, or in some
cases broader, rights than those provided by Article VIII(l). Although
the Supreme Court in Sumitomo stated that, because of the possibility of
different negotiating histories, each case must be decided on an individual
basis,'32 any decision on the issue of the relationship of Title VII to Japa-
nese foreign branches' employment rights will carry great weight in sub-
sequent interpretations of other treaties that conflict with Title VII.
A. Restructuring to Avoid Title VII
Direct foreign investments in the United States are approaching one
trillion dollars' 33 and have created an estimated 2.5 million American
jobs.'3 4 Japanese direct investment in the United States amounted to al-
most fifteen billion dollars by the end of 1984,1' m and continued invest-
ment is expected. In 1979, when Japanese direct investment was only
nine billion dollars, 136 Japanese-owned enterprises in the United States
130. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
131. For a partial list, see 1 I.L.M. 92 (1962).
132. 457 U.S. 176, 185 n.12 (1982).
133. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at A14, col.1.
134. Id.
135. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, at A18, col. 6.
136. Coupe & Baier, Do International Treaties Justify Job Discrimination?, Legal Times of
Washington, Jan. 11, 1982, at 20.
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employed 81,300 Americans. 137 The number of Americans employed by
Japanese companies probably has almost doubled with the corresponding
increase in investment.
One possible repercussion of the Sumitomo decision is that locally
incorporated Japanese subsidiaries now might choose to reorganize as
Japanese branch operations. By giving up their local incorporation sta-
tus they could avoid the immediate effect of the Supreme Court's holding
in Sumitomo, which strips them of any Treaty rights and holds them to
Title VII standards. As the Second Circuit's opinion in Sumitomo 1
38
illustrates, however, Japanese branches that may assert Article VIII(l)
rights still face potential Title VII liability. Moreover, although in the
Fifth Circuit, Article VIII(l) is a complete defense to Title VII, 1 39 locally
incorporated Japanese companies in that Circuit, and in all other circuits
except the Second Circuit, may determine reorganization is too great a
sacrifice. For instance, one advantage of operating as a locally incorpo-
rated subsidiary rather than a foreign branch is that the liability of a
subsidiary is limited to the subsidiary's assets."4 In the case of a branch
operation, the assets of the parent company may be used to satisfy
debts. 4 ' Other advantages include favorable tax treatment and possible
market prestige. 142
B. Discouragement of Investment
Applying Title VII to Japanese branches may discourage foreign in-
vestment because parent companies may no longer perceive themselves
as having control over foreign operations. Because foreign investment
provides many jobs for American citizens, withdrawal by foreign compa-
nies from the United States could depress the United States economy
significantly.
The United States offers so many of the advantages multinationals
seek in their overseas investment, such as security and profitability, that
any widespread divesture by foreign companies over Title VII restraints
is unlikely. Nonetheless, the United States must take into consideration
the threat to stability in both the political and economic spheres when
137. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982, at DI, col. 1.
138. 638 F. 2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
139. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
140. Considerations regarding whether to operate through a branch or a foreign subsidiary
appear in W. STRENG, INTERNATIONAL BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS TAX AND LEGAL HAND-
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unilateral restriction of a commercial treaty right is sought. Moreover,
because treaties operate reciprocally, United States companies abroad
similarly may be required to conform to the local hiring laws in the for-
eign countries in which they operate.
C. Legal Ramifications
Finally, the legal implications of the refusal to exempt Japanese
branches from Title VII are unclear. On the one hand, if branches are
held exempt from Title VII because of Article VIII(l), arguably they
would also be insulated from other United States employment laws such
as the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 the Labor Management Relations
Act," and the contract compliance program."' Moreover, foreign
branches would be completely free to discriminate unfairly among their
own nationals. 146 On the other hand, to hold Japanese companies fully
accountable to other federal labor and discrimination laws may unneces-
sarily abrogate additional Treaty rights. Conflicts between the Treaty
and other federal labor laws would not be resolved as easily as the con-
flict between Title VII and Article VIII(l) where, for example, there is
no BFOQ exemption to serve as a compromise.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Sumitomo stripped Sumitomo Shoji Ameri-
can, Inc., of any protection under the Japanese Treaty by holding that, as
a locally incorporated subsidiary, it had no standing to assert Treaty
rights. However, the Court neither decided, nor indicated in dicta,
whether privileges granted in Article VIII(l) of the Treaty provide an
effective defense to a Title VII action against a Japanese branch opera-
tion. Currently the Second and Fifth Circuits have reached opposite
conslusions on whether Japanese branches must comply with Title VII
when hiring for upper-level management positions. The Fifth Circuit in
Spiess 147 held that Article VIII(l) carves out a specific exception to gen-
eral Title VII coverage. The Second Circuit read the two laws congru-
ently, holding that Title VII does apply to Japanese branches. However,
143. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.
145. Muskee & Dupee, Policy Conflicts in Treaties, Job Bias Law Emerges, Legal Times of
Washington, Nov. 23, 1981.
146. For a discussion on foreign plaintiffs' access to United States tribunals see Note, Com-
mercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31
STAN. L. REv. 947, 972-75 (1979).
147. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the Court softened the impact of its holding by stating that the statutory
exemption to Title VII (the BFOQ) should be applied to Japanese
branches with a lower level of scrutiny, thus giving deference to the
rights provided in the Treaty.
It is evident that a conflict exists between the rights granted in the
Japanese Treaty and the prohibitions against discrimination embodied in
Title VII. Article VIII(l) allows Japanese companies to choose upper-
level management employees "of their choice," regardless of nationality,
for their overseas operations in the United States. The "of their choice"
language is an unconditional right as evidenced by the language of the
Treaty and its legislative and negotiating history. Title VII, however,
prohibits hiring criteria, such as a Japanese citizenship requirement for
upper-level management, that have any discriminatory impact on a par-
ticular national origin. Because Japan's citizenry is almost entirely of
Japanese national origin, a Japanese citizenship requirement excludes
those not of Japanese ancestry from upper-level management positions.
It is clear that Title VII does not permit reverse discrimination except
when it is used to correct past discriminatory behavior. Because a Japa-
nese citizenship requirement has a discriminatory effect on all applicants
not of Japanese national origin, it violates Title VII.
When a treaty and a federal law conflict, the courts must first at-
tempt to read them in a complementary fashion so that both are
respected without abrogating one or the other. Consistency between Ti-
tle VII and Article VIII(l) cannot be achieved without questionable re-
striction of either the authority of Title VII or the intended scope of
Article VIII(l). Because neither of these two alternatives honors the in-
tent of the drafters of the Treaty or Title VII, resolution by the courts is
difficult. According to case law, because federal laws and treaties are
equal in weight, those which come later in time must be deemed control-
ling as the last expression of the sovereign will. Under this principle,
Title VII will be the controlling law for Japanese branches operating in
the United States to the extent that Article VIII(l) is inconsistent with it.
In defending Title VII actions, Japanese branch operations, as well
as locally incorporated Japanese companies, may be able to argue suc-
cessfully that Japanese citizenship is a BFOQ for working in upper-level
management. There is little doubt that a Japanese citizenship require-
ment for top executive personnel of a Japanese affiliate will meet the
strict test for establishing a BFOQ exemption to Title VII. However, for
the remaining management positions listed in Article VIII(l), a Japanese
citizenship requirement may not be a BFOQ, and therefore may violate
TItle VII. To soften the impact of such a finding, courts may relax
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
BFOQ requirements for the remaining named positions in Article
VIII(l). This was the Second Circuit's approach to effectuate a compro-
mise between the Treaty rights and Title VII restraints.
The argument that BFOQ requirements should be relaxed to accom-
modate the cultural biases of a foreign employer should be rejected. 148 It
is appropriate, however, to consider an applicant's understanding of Jap-
anese sociocultural characteristics and the unique Japanese system of
business management in attempting to define BFOQ's for a Japanese
branch.
The resolution of both present and future conflicts between Article
VIII(l) and United States civil rights and labor laws breaks down to a
balancing of policies. The goals of encouraging and accommodating for-
eign investment through Treaty privileges and enjoying reciprocal rights
for United States companies abroad must be balanced against the com-
mitment of the United States to civil rights and fair labor standards.
Although justiciable, the question is highly political in nature. Thus,
perhaps the Supreme Court correctly declined to decide the issue in
Sumitomo in the hope that Congress would debate and decide the issue in
the near future in what might be a more appropriate forum.
148. See supra note 129.
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